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Trying to unpack a notion as complex as that of the public and its socio-legal 
connotations gives me permission to ask a more meta-theoretical question which 
nonetheless is a corollary to what has been debated so far. The issue I would like to 
address concerns the philosophical implications of claims about the normative 
function of law. The way in which normativity and the public generically construed 
are interrelated is much more intimate than initially assumed. Unlike many other hotly 
disputed topics in philosophy there has been an emerging consensus that there can be 
no such thing as private normative reasons. There are many ways to understand the 
public nature of normativity, but it suffices for our purposes that normativity is 
understood as cutting across different agents. So, on this minimal understanding 
normativity is meant to rise from our interpersonal relations. I do not wish to add any 
more substantive content into my exposition as it will needlessly complicate the 
discussion which is specifically centered on the nature of legal normativity rather than 
normativity as a whole.  
The structure of the paper will be simple. In the first part I shall give a brief 
overview of the current meta-normative inquiry. This section is more or less dedicated 
to painting a relatively informative map of some important distinctions operative 
within the domain of normative metaphysics. The key elements in this section include 
the alleged metaphysical primitiveness of reasons and the nature of normative 
explanations. Particular emphasis will be placed on the structure of constitutive 
explanations as they figure prominently in arguments regarding the normativity of 
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social practices, including law. In the second part I shall put forward the claim that 
‘the normativity of all that is normative’ may not be exhausted by the concept of 
reasons. I intend to keep my claim weak enough so as to allow space for a more 
quietist understanding of normativity. More precisely, I shall suggest that there are 
two classes of rational requirements—requirements of coherence between mental 
states and explanatory requirements—that seem to be recalcitrant to reasons analysis 
and yet are capable of providing informative explanations as to how various 
normative phenomena operate. The remainder of the paper serves to elaborate on the 
relevance of two aforementioned points. The first point regards the distortive impact 
of constitutive explanations in the domain of social practices. The second point serves 
to amend the inadequacy of constitutivism as an explanatory tool. The suggestion I 
hope to be able to take through is that the normative nature of participatory social 
practices like games or etiquette is better thought of as inviting the application of 
coherence requirements, whereas legal normativity is properly understood as a source 
of explanatory requirements. If this strategy is shown to make some sense, then many 
interesting conclusions may follow regarding the nature of normativity tout court and 
its relation to institutional activity. 
 
1.1 Normativity for Beginners 
 
Our most intuitive grasp of normativity is, queerly enough, descriptive. What I mean 
by descriptive is that our usual affirmative appeals to the normative are enumerative 
in the sense that we attach normativity to anything that stems from our use of 
concepts like norms, values, oughts, reasons, goodness, rightness, correctness, 
rationality etc. A more philosophically nuanced approach to normativity tries to bring 
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some order into the normative universe by drawing a wedge between evaluative and 
deontic properties. The former are typically instantiated in judgments about what is 
good or valuable whereas the latter are usually understood as introducing constraints 
in our judgments about what is the right thing to do, believe or feel. A final 
classificatory construal divides the normative repertoire into thick and thin properties. 
A mark of thick concepts is, as Bernard Williams has suggested, that they seem to be 
simultaneously both evaluative and descriptive. Trait concepts like ‘courageous’ or 
‘lewd’ are typically classified as bearing a thick structure. The thought is that the 
property of being courageous has two different by nature yet interdependent 
components. It’s not just the case that a courageous man is brave and good, but brave 
and good for being brave. In that sense the descriptive part is rendered intelligible in 
light of the attitude that is deemed fitting for the bearer of such a property. By contrast 
thin properties like that of being right, wrong, good or desirable, are considered as 
lacking the descriptive depth or specificity of thick predicates in the sense that we use 
them across widely variable contexts to evaluate all sorts of persons, states of affairs, 
or actions.  
 
1.2 The Reign of Reasons? 
 
So far talk about normativity is more like swirling around the core of a concept whose 
essence remains uncapturable. I do not aspire to put an end to this agonizing quest. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to gain further insight into the metaphysics of normativity 
by exploring the possibility of adding, at least, some structure to the normative 
universe on the basis of relations of derivative properties to a fundamental normative 
category. Many philosophers tend to answer the primitiveness or fundamentality 
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question by accepting a more or less robust version of the claim that the ultimate 
source of normativity consists in an intricate network of relations to reasons for 
actions or for attitudes. This latter claim need not amount to the purely conceptual 
remark that the concept of a reason is definitionally primitive in the sense that all 
other normative concepts can be defined in its terms. Defining one concept in terms of 
another does not always settle the question of what is the direction of metaphysical 
dependence in the bi-conditional with the concept of a reason as definiens. The claim 
is rather metaphysical in that the nature of normative properties—not just normative 
concepts—consists in their relations to reasons. Although I shall not espouse the 
optimism of those who defend the metaphysical primitiveness of reasons, I shall 
expand on this reductive hypothesis as it provides the most powerful contrast with the 
picture I wish to develop. 
 
1.3 Reason-Giving Facts and their Explanation 
 
Assuming for the moment that reasons enjoy metaphysical priority in the normative 
cosmos a few remarks are in order regarding the logical structure of reason statements 
of the form ‘A has a reason to φ in C’ or ‘there is a reason for A to φ in C’. There is 
close to consensus that the property of being a reason is relational in the sense that it 
denotes a relation between a proposition or a fact, a set of contextual conditions and 
an action or attitude. Reason-giving facts can have non-normative as well as 
normative contents. They can be facts about our world—as when the fact that my best 
friend is sick is a reason for me to visit him—, they can be facts about our 
propositional attitudes—as when the fact that I desire to eat ice cream is a reason to 
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buy some—or, they can be normatively laden facts—as when the fact that it would be 
good to be friendly to a new colleague is a reason for me to assist him. 
Nevertheless, facts do not merely figure as a convenient placeholder in the left-side 
of the reasons relation. It is a further question whether the normative fact that 
something is a reason for something else is itself an item that calls for some further 
unpacking. It is an almost common conviction that reason statements are not true 
simpliciter but hold in virtue of some other more fundamental truths or grounds. What 
is important to notice is that the relation of a reason relation to a grounding fact or 
proposition is not merely metaphysical but explanatory. To illustrate my point, when 
we say such things as that John ought to return Peter’s book because he promised to 
do so, we are naturally taken to suggest that the moral principle that ceteris paribus 
promises ought to be kept not merely makes it the case that giving the book back to 
Peter is the right thing to do but also makes it intelligible why this is the case.  
What matters the most for our purposes, however, is not what figures as the proper 
content of a normative explanation. Rather it is the way the explanans is related to the 
explanandum that calls for attention. Put more succinctly, figuring out what explains 
the fact that killing people is wrong might be cashed out in terms of a further reason 
statement or evaluative verdict depending on our favoured metaethical perspective. 
By contrast, the issue I am addressing is, so to speak, meta-explanatory in the sense 
that the way we formalize an explanatory relation may significantly impact the 
adequacy of our explanans.  
Although I do not profess to be capable of providing an exhaustive map of 
explanatory modalities, I am confident enough that the two modes of normative 
explanation I am about to describe can more than adequately enhance our grasp of 
normative phenomena including social practices.  
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The first type of normative explanation is foundationalist. On this approach, the 
fact that there is a reason for me to φ is explained in virtue of some categorical 
generalization that requires to π such that φ-ing is an instance of the generic activity 
of π-ing prescribed in the explanans. On this view, the normative fact that one is 
required to π must be prior to and independent of any dispositional fact on pain of 
vicious circularity. Adopting this explanatory model is not without consequences; a 
voluntarist theory of practical reasons like Williams’ account of internal reasons is 
incapable of accommodating this mode of explanation. To figure out why, recall that 
an internal reasons proponent believes that one’s having a reason to do something 
holds in virtue of the content of her psychological attitudes that she would come to 
acquire if she deliberated properly. To put it more graphically, Keith has an internal 
reason to help his financially devastated friend in virtue of the fact that he has 
acquired the desire to help him and has no false beliefs about the actual conditions of 
his friend’s destitution. For this explanation to fit the foundationalist type of 
normative explanation, it must appeal to some further thing that everyone has a reason 
to do, such that ceteris paribus everyone ought to provide assistance to friends and 
not just because one has acquired the desire to do so. Appealing to the latter fact 
makes the explanation circular. A Williams-like reasons internalism cannot 
accommodate universalizable imperatives, hence the foundationalist explanatory 
model is unlikely to work in this case. 
The second type of normative explanation is constitutive. The constitutivist 
strategy aims at explaining the normative authority of reasons or values in terms of 
the nature or essence of a generic property or state of affairs. To illustrate my point, 
proponents of moral constructivism try to explain the binding force of rational 
principles by interpreting them as standards of correctness derivable from the nature 
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of agency or intentional action. On this model explaining the normative validity of a 
principle or norm is not a matter of subsuming it under an independently valid 
categorical rule; rather it comes down to showing that the relevant norm is a partial 
description of agency itself. On this construal constitutivism is reductive by default in 
the sense that by saying that being under an obligation to φ is just what it is to be an 
agent one is committed to the idea that normative principles can be explained in terms 
of other normative—or non-normative—notions. 
 
2.1 Rational Requirements and the Bootstrapping Problem 
 
The view that normativity is more or less amenable to the operation of reasons is not 
unobjectionable. Apart from arguments internal to the normativity debate, I am 
particularly inclined to feel suspicious of the tenability of this thesis as it seems to 
generate grossly unintuitive results when applied to the domain of social practices I 
aim to explore. The alternative view I would like to espouse favours a kind of 
normative pluralism in the sense that it postulates the existence of mutually 
irreducible normative concepts each one performing a distinct practical or epistemic 
function. Granted that a theory of normativity amenable to being characterized as 
plural could be any theory that postulates the existence of at least two mutually 
irreducible normative concepts, I shall try to keep things as simple as possible by 
choosing to employ one theoretical version of normative pluralism according to which 
apart from the concept of a reason there are rational requirements serve a distinct 
normative function. 
Rational requirements are standardly taken to specify which conflicts between our 
various propositional attitudes ought to be resolved or avoided if we are still lacking 
 8
one of the conflicting attitudes. A typical example is the rational requirement not to 
have inconsistent intentions or beliefs, as in the case of someone who simultaneously 
believes that she ought to attend a class reunion and she does not intend to attend it. 
Another case is when someone does not intend what she believes to be the necessary 
means to her intended ends. In the cases above as well as in various others, rationality 
requires a certain kind of coherence among mental states. Some of our acquired 
attitudes will intuitively not fit to our current shape of mental states and thus need to 
be properly adjusted or even abandoned if one is to avoid conflict. 
The leading intuition behind the theory about the distinctness of rational 
requirements is that our mental capacities are frequently the source of incoherent or 
morally objectionable claims. Philosophers of normativity tend to describe the 
relevant phenomena as ‘bootstrapping’. Typical cases of bootstrapping include 
paradigmatic instances of immoral instrumental reasoning as when I desire to kill my 
mother-in-law and believe that a sufficient means for achieving this end is to hire an 
assassin. Is it intelligible—the ‘bootstrapping’ objector goes—to say that I have a 
reason of some kind to hire an assassin? To put it differently, it’s simply not the case 
that simply by holding a desire or a normative belief we ipso facto acquire a 
respective reason as a matter of metaphysical necessity. 
 
2.2 Wide or Narrow Scope? 
 
Just how precisely a rational requirement is normative is a highly contestable issue. 
My main concern is not to provide a comprehensive map of candidate accounts 
defending the normativity of rational requirements. I am more interested in 
showcasing the structural dimension of the relevant controversy. It is rather accurate 
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to say that proponents of the normative nature of rational requirements generally tend 
to favour the so-called wide-scope model1, whereas those wishing to debunk their 
normative import usually employ a narrow-scope formula.  
To cut a long story short, ‘wide-scopers’ believe that an indispensable step towards 
vindicating the normativity of rational requirements is to offer a plausible solution to 
the bootstrapping problem whilst retaining a normative story about the norms of 
rationality. The solution offered by wide-scopers as a means of avoiding unwanted 
reasons detachments amounts to the claim that one can equally satisfy a rational 
requirement by revising any one of the relevant conflicting attitude-states. There is no 
preference either as to what outcome among the permissible ones should be brought 
about or as to what is the ideal means for reaching an outcome. All that rational 
requirements call for is the avoidance of certain combinations of mental states no 
matter what means one employs in trying to satisfy the requirement. The 
normativity—thin as it may be—of a rational requirement is not of the same genre as 
the normative guidance provided by all-things-considered obligations. Wide-scope 
requirements perform the more modest task of specifying the permissible ways of 
resolving rational inconsistencies. Or reversely, their normative function is negative in 
the sense that it only forbids one precise combination of attitudes to hold leaving it up 
to the deliberator to choose the alternative ways of resolving the tension.  
On the contrary, ‘narrow-scopers’ try to account for the apparent normativity of 
rational requirements by explaining it away. That is, they offer an eliminative 
reduction base for requirements of coherence by cashing them out in terms of 
descriptive claims about the beliefs we have about what there is a reason to do, feel or 
believe. On the narrow-scope view, having a state-given reason—a normative belief 
                                                 
1 For a more extensive defence of the wide-scope formulation see, among many, John Broome, 
‘Normative requirements’, (1999) 12 Ratio 398–419 and ‘Wide or Narrow Scope?’, (2007) 116 Mind 
359–70. 
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or a desire-based reason—has no genuine normative implications. If the bearer of 
such a reason still experiences a sentiment of rational failure by desisting from acting 
on her believed reason, that fact merely amounts to a failure from a point of view. 
Perspectival failures are not normative in any robust sense though. Hence, for a 
narrow-scoper the normativity of rational requirements is just out of the question. 
 
2.3 Requirements of Coherence and Explanatory Requirements 
 
Insofar as one is willing to subscribe to the view that there is a point of substance in 
preserving a function for rational requirements, there arises the further question of 
what serves as a criterion in classifying rational requirements.  
A large—maybe the largest—class of rational requirements contains requirements 
of formal coherence among mental states. Coherence requirements are formal in the 
sense that they do not guide our deliberation as to what pair of attitudes to choose 
among other alternatives. The intuitive idea is that formally incoherent attitudes 
generate some kind of normative tension which can be resolved by revising one of the 
conflicting attitudes. Hence, understanding the non-contradiction principle in terms of 
formal coherence entails that one is rationally required to avoid believing that p and 
non-p at the same time. It is equally coherent to say that one satisfies this requirement 
by dropping her initial belief that p or by not believing that not-p. So, on this 
construal, formal coherence does not amount to the virtue of achieving the best 
possible combination of attitudes. Consequently, formal coherence is content-
independent or agent-neutral in the sense that it is not conditional on one’s particular 
situation.   
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The second class of rational requirements deals with another type of normative 
problem which seems to remain unresolved by merely applying a requirement of 
formal coherence. There are some cases of relations between attitudes that we are 
intuitively guided to regard as introducing a certain kind of asymmetry between the 
relata. For instance, the instrumental requirement to intend what one believes is a 
sufficient means for achieving an intended end provides a characteristic example of 
asymmetric rational relations between attitudes. Suppose that I intend to φ. 
Intuitively, it would be rational to intend π because I believe that π is a means for 
achieving φ, but irrational to drop the belief that π is a means to φ just because I do 
not intend to π. The asymmetry I am suggesting refers to the way one attitude is 
explained by another; it does not refer to the quite different ‘asymmetry’ that seems to 
emerge when absent some independent reason to drop my intention to φ, I stop 
intending to φ rather than considering the possibility of acquiring the intention to 
adopt π as a means to achieving my initial end. The later apparent asymmetry2 
concerns the intuitive unequal distribution of ‘attractive power’ among the two ways 
of satisfying the wide-scope instrumental requirement. To return back to my preferred 
understanding of the relevant asymmetry, explanatory requirements seem to disfavour 
a particular explanatory connection. That is to say, I may disbelieve π is a means to φ, 
but I am not to disbelieve it because I do not intend to π. Consequently explanatory 
requirements have also a wide-scope structure in the sense that it is not the case that I 
ought to believe that π is a means to φ because I intend to φ. 
                                                 
2 This different kind of asymmetry has been considered by defenders of the narrow-
scope view as a fatal flaw of the wide-scope formula. See, Mark Schroeder, ‘The 
Scope of Instrumental Reason’, (2004) 18 Philosophical Perspectives p 352 and 
Matthew Bedke, ‘The Iffiest Oughts: A Guise of Reasons Account of End-Given 
Conditionals’, (2009) 119 Ethics p 687-9. 
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3.1 Constitutivity and Constitutive Explanations in the Domain of Social 
Practices 
 
There is a plethora of occasions where we feel the intuitive urge to say that someone 
participating in some sort of conventional practice should abide by its rules. Thus, if I 
decide to move my bishop sideways one may retort that this is not how chess is 
played and that I should reconsider my move. Likewise, if I have adopted the practice 
of etiquette, I should not put the wine glass on the left side of the plate. The question 
is: how are we to explain the normative pressure exerted in such cases? The problem 
is that even if I have extremely weak reason or no reason at all to engage in a practice, 
the practice itself seems to generate very rigid requirements. The former remark does 
not suggest that practice-immanent requirements have the mystical capacity of 
overriding or silencing the reasons for or against participating in the practice. The 
asymmetry I want to capture is not a matter of weight.  
The most familiar strategy for explaining the apparent asymmetry between the 
external and internal aspects of practice-agency is a direct application of the 
constitutive explanatory model I have described in section 1.3. The usual argument 
comes down to the claim that moving my castle in a straight line is just what it is to be 
a chess player. One might stop here thinking that this is the most convincing answer 
he can get. But the normative question still lingers and this can be easily shown by 
reformulating it as: ‘In virtue of what do I have a reason to abide by the rule that 
demands my moving the castle in a straight line?’ Why is the fact that moving the 
castle in a straight line is a constitutive rule of chess a reason to conform to it? One 
plausible reply is to say that literally speaking there is no real reason to act in 
accordance with this rule; it’s just a game. But if this is our best answer, we ipso facto 
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abandon the intuitive idea that there is something non-trivially normative in the case 
of playing chess. Another answer could be that insofar as it is somehow valuable to 
play chess in the first place you have a reason to play by its rules. But this reply is at 
pains to explain the intuitive asymmetry between the value of participation and the 
conclusiveness of practice-requirements. 
The alternative answer I tend to favour is premised on the remark that the way in 
which a set of rules is constitutive of a conventional practice like chess is not 
reducible to the way a proper constitutive normative explanation works. The point is 
that being a constitutive rule is a metaphysical property of abstract objects (rules) that 
has no explanatory function vis-à-vis the normative implications of being a practice 
participant. To be a constitutive rule is not an elliptical answer to the question of why 
I ought to follow the rule; it is a property that partially3 makes it the case that this 
practice is chess and not checkers.  It is precisely because a constitutive rule has no 
independent explanatory power that it is perfectly intelligible to ask whether I have a 
reason to participate in the practice in the first place. That is to say, the 
aforementioned asymmetry is a manifestation of the limited—non-explanatory—role 
of ‘constitution’ in the case of conventional practices.  
 
                                                 
3 I say ‘partially’ because it is inaccurate to claim that only the rules determine the 
identity of a practice. As Andrei Marmor explains, ‘the identity of such a practice, 
like chess, is partly path dependent’ (A Marmor, Social Conventions: From Language 
to Law, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, p 42 n 16). There is always a 
‘metaphysical residue’ that is extraneous to the concept of a rule that specifies how 
the behavior in accordance with those rules is to be regarded. A Wittgensteinian 
proper way to say this is to refer to the ‘grammar’ of a practice as that which 
determines what sorts of things it makes sense to say with respect to chess. This meta-
rule dimension is particularly relevant in strategic utterances like ‘that was a silly 
move’ or ‘well played’. For an incisive approach see H Schwyzer, ‘Rules and 
Practices’ (1969) 78 Philosophical Review 451-67. 
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3.2 Formal Coherence and the Normative Asymmetry of Participatory 
Practices   
 
All I have claimed in the previous section is that in the case of participatory practices 
a constitutive explanation cannot work insofar as it is premised on the concept of 
constitutive rules. I have said nothing about whether it is possible to articulate another 
constitutive explanation that obviates the pitfalls of the former account. Nevertheless I 
do not intend to elaborate any further on the prospects of constitutive explanations in 
the domain of social practices. The reason I wanted to exclude this particular version 
of constitutive explanation was rather tactical; I wanted to show that constitutive 
explanations of this particular kind have been standardly employed as an answer to 
the question of why I have a reason to abide by the constitutive rules of a practice. 
That is to say, my real target was a statement like ‘you have a reason to abide by this 
rule because following it is constitutive of this practice’. Moreover, I am agnostic 
about how a constitutive explanation could work without the concept of a reason 
occupying the position of the explanandum. 
That being said, we are left with no guidance as to how to describe the normative 
function of a social practice like chess. A way to move forward is—I believe—to 
reformulate the structure of the asymmetry described above and try to see whether it 
can be captured by a wide-scope rational requirement formula. A promising way to 
proceed is by utilizing an ingenious distinction suggested by John Broome with regard 
to the logical properties of requirements in general. Broome distinguishes between the 
property sense and the source sense of requirements of morality, rationality or 
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prudence.4 The property sense of morality manifests itself in utterances such as 
humans are moral animals or John is a moral person. In this sense the property of 
being moral denotes an attainment of some sort which is ascribable to a person. So, 
when we understand morality in the property sense a statement like ‘Morality requires 
of John that φ’ entails that necessarily, if John bears the property of being moral, he 
φ-s.5 Property requirements display an interesting gradability in the sense that it is 
intelligible to say that there a more moral way to achieve this end. What is interesting 
about the degrees of property requirements is that they do not provide guidance as to 
what one ought to do. Broome uses a very illustrative example to depict this 
incongruity. If I can be moral either by using less energy or by giving more money to 
Oxfam, a property understanding of the relevant requirement could legitimize the 
statement that it is not the case that morality requires that I use less energy. But as 
Broome remarks, that is intuitively wrong. It is rather the case that morality requires 
both that I use less energy and that I give more money to Oxfam. 
What counterbalances the unintuitive implications of the property construal of 
requirements is the source approach or, as I would like to term it, the ‘action-guiding’ 
approach. Source requirements are better understood as individual propositions 
specifying what is required in a particular circumstance. Thus source requirements are 
                                                 
4 For a cogent overview of the distinction see John Broome, ‘Requirements’ in Toni 
Rønnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson and Dan Egonsson (eds), 
Homage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, Lund 
University, 2007. 
5 Notice that the meaning of the necessity operator does not cover every metaphysical 
possibility but is context-dependent. That is to say, it is not the case that necessarily if 
John does not φ, he is immoral. There might be a context within which φ-ing is a 
morally sub-optimal choice. This is something that a strong counterfactual 
interpretation of the property sense of a requirement cannot capture. A reverse 
implication of this strictly modal interpretation is that the possibility of being moral 
has to be secured in the sense that it would be counterintuitive to address a 
requirement to someone when it is counterfactually impossible for her to bear the 
respective property. 
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operative within a particular possible world at which the corresponding required 
proposition is true. So whereas at the actual world w I am required—in the source 
sense—to be kind to strangers, at another possible world where I am not sociophobic 
it is not the case that I am required to be kind to strangers. On the source construal, 
requirements I am under may not be the same at all worlds. This is a feature that the 
property construal cannot capture. Being moral is too ‘insatiable’ a property to guide 
us in particular situations—where we are inevitably fallible somehow—in the sense 
that what is required of me is an infinite set of propositions that are necessary 
conditions for my qualifying as being moral. 
How can we utilize this distinction in our present case? First of all, I have to 
designate somehow the corresponding terms for the property and source sense for 
practices of the sort we’ve been discussing so far. I deliberately choose to use the 
property term ‘being a participant’ in order to provide a generic characterization for 
members of a practice. The property of being a participant can be more ‘thickly’ 
described depending on the particular practice we are dealing with. So we can say that 
by following the rules of chess one bears the property of being a chess player and so 
forth. We can further thicken those properties by adding some reference to the value 
of the practice or some features that rigidly designate it. As for the source sense it 
suffices to talk about practice requirements. 
What makes the property-source distinction particularly useful for our purposes is 
a very interesting disanalogy between the standard uses of this distinction for sources 
of requirements like morality, prudence or rationality, and its potential use in the 
domain of social practices. In the former case the source sense and the property sense 
are necessarily co-instantiated in the sense that when morality requires you, in the 
source sense, to φ, it follows—by strict implication—that morality also requires, in 
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the property sense, to φ. Otherwise put, you cannot satisfy each particular requirement 
without bearing the property of, say, being moral. But that is not the case in practice 
requirements. I can get rid of the property of being a participant without so failing to 
satisfy a practice requirement. For example, I may decide not to play chess without 
violating in any sense its rules. Whereas in the former cases source requirements 
necessarily set the boundaries of their property correlatives, in the case of a 
participatory practice source and property sense come entirely apart without incurring 
criticism of any kind.  
Now I would like to argue that this is not a trivial remark; on the contrary it serves 
as the major incentive for applying a wide-scope formula in order to explicate the 
normative function of a large set of practices, namely those that are participatory in 
some substantive sense. To see how this works allow me once again to contrast our 
case with the domain of rationality where the wide-scope strategy is more explicitly 
deployed. In the latter case the wide-scope formula does not govern the relation 
between the source and the property sense of rational requirements. As it has already 
been said, these two senses are inseparable. The disjunctive ways of satisfying a 
rational requirement refer, instead, to our propositional attitudes, not to the 
requirement itself that regulates their relation. To recall a classical example, I can 
satisfy the instrumental requirement either by dropping my intention to fulfill an end 
or by intending to take the appropriate means for its achievement. By sharp contrast, I 
can satisfy the chess requirement either by conforming to its local source 
requirements (rules) or by not participating or withdrawing participation, that is, by 
not bearing or revoking the property of being a participant.  
On this new picture, a plausible answer to the normative question with regard to 
participatory practices comes down to this: 
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One is practice required [either to follow its rules or to cease to participate/not bear 
the property of a partcipant] 
The above requirement has wide scope in the sense that it can be satisfied in two 
equivalent ways. The normative prohibition implied by this proposition is that one 
should not be a participant and, at the same time, not abide by the relevant rules. This 
negative proviso is the core of the normativity of participatory practices. On this 
construal, requirements pertaining to participatory practices are actually requirements 
of formal coherence just like the majority of requirements of individual rationality. In 
our present case, formal coherence is understood as coherence between the source and 
property sense of a practice requirement as opposed to the rationality case where 
formal coherence is supposed to govern the relation between our relevant attitudes. 
 
3.3 Law as a Source of Wide-Scope Explanatory Requirements   
 
Is all the previous analysis somehow informative as to how law performs its 
normative operation? My aspiration is to show that what has preceded this last section 
of my paper was not an unnecessary digression but an indispensable background 
against which I may be able to advance an original argument about legal normativity. 
The three key concepts I shall be employing throughout this last section are already 
familiar: the wide-scope formula, the distinction between coherence and explanatory 
requirements as well as the distinction between the property and the source sense of 
requirements. 
I shall begin my analysis by examining whether it is possible to apply the property-
source distinction to the legal case. My answer will be negative and here’s why: if I 
were to pick out one specific property that is distinctive of law that would most 
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plausible be the property of being legal. Thus, we say, for example, that this is the 
legal way to notarize a contract or that it is illegal to drive under the age of 16. I 
deliberately choose to keep the property of legality as thin as possible in order to 
avoid question-begging commitments regarding the nature of law. That is, if I were to 
choose a thicker property as that of being lawful or fair I would be presupposing 
something that I had not presupposed in the previous cases. In the case of morality or 
rationality the property sense of their respective requirements is not informative in 
any robust sense as to what is the nature of morality or rationality. Being moral or 
rational is just the property correlative of being under a moral or rational requirement. 
A more informative approach would be to ‘thicken’ the respective properties by 
saying something like ‘being such that maximizes utility’ or ‘being such that 
preserves coherence’. But these descriptions do not seem to follow immediately from 
the concept of being moral or rational. They are further substantive elaborations of the 
initial, generic property of being moral or rational. Likewise in the case of law, 
choosing to thicken the property of legality is to presuppose too much already. 
Therefore, I shall stick to the initial thin version of being legal as interpreted in the 
examples mentioned above.  
Now supposing that what I have said so far is more or less unobjectionable I move 
to a crucial observation that follows from my last remark. Once again John Broome 
has astutely remarked that law is never the name of a property that can be possessed 
by a person. Being legal is always the property of acts or normative propositions but it 
cannot be informatively ascribed to a person. A point of caution is in order: one could 
respond to this remark by saying that being law-abiding is the respective property 
possessed by law subjects. But that is plainly wrong. The latter property is simply 
trivial as it is a mere adjectivization of the respective source requirement. To say that 
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one is a law-abiding citizen is just to say that she satisfies the relevant legal 
requirements. But, as explained above, to be a requirement in the property sense is 
much more ‘global’ than merely satisfying the requirements one is under in a 
particular situation. Therefore, law-abidingness won’t work as an informative 
property correlative of legal source requirements. 
The crucial point now is: what follows from the fact that law can be understood 
only as generating requirements in the source sense? I believe that what ensues from 
this remark is far from trivial. First, the fact that persons cannot claim the property of 
being legal as being entailed by the respective source requirements reveals a 
conceptual truth about law that many political and legal philosophers tend to 
recognize. Law is not a participatory conventional practice in the sense that the 
acquisition or loss of legal status is not a genuinely voluntary act of individuals. The 
status of a citizen or a legal person within a certain legal jurisdiction is constituted by 
the law and cannot be freely disposed of irrespective of the relevant rules governing 
one’s legal status. It is important to notice that this is not a moral truth about law but a 
conceptual feature about its institutional operation. Second, given that persons cannot 
genuinely bear the property of being legal, their individual beliefs or intentions with 
regard to the law qua source requirement are not robustly relevant. To illustrate my 
point, recall that coherence requirements are premised on the assumption that for 
every system of source requirements there is a corresponding property that denotes 
some sort of attainment with regard to the total satisfaction of the respective source 
requirements. If I satisfy all relevant source requirements either by revising my initial 
attitude (belief or intention) or by acquiring the respective belief or intention, I ipso 
facto acquire the property of being rational, moral or prudent. Thus, being moral or 
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rational is directly related to the ways in which I go about revising or acting upon 
individual beliefs or intentions.  
So, in virtue of what kind of attitudes are we related to law as a source of 
requirements with no respective property ascription? Normativity cannot be entirely 
severed from our attitudinal responses to normative demands, so something must be 
the case regarding our relation qua agents towards the law. A helpful thought is to 
argue that the way we are related to the law is not matter of our psychological 
dispositions vis-à-vis the relevant legal requirements. Being a member of a legal 
community is neither the result nor the condition of a psychological property of its 
actual members. That is to say, it is not the case that revising or readjusting our beliefs 
or intentions about the law is what is needed in order to say that we are on the correct 
normative track with regard to law. My suggestion is that our relevant attitudes 
towards the law as a system of source requirements are explanatory and not brutely 
psychological. It is not simply the fact that by formulating an explanation as to 
whether we have a reason to act in accordance with the law we are thereby engaged in 
some sort of intentional activity. That’s rather self-obvious. What I aim to stress is 
that the very act of explaining is a type of attitude that is constitutively directed to 
making things intelligible to oneself.6 When I am trying to understand what is the 
case when I am confronted with a legal obligation of some kind, I am not merely 
projecting my beliefs about what ought to be the case or my motivating intentions that 
causally explain my law-abiding or law-breaking behavior. Making sense of our 
relation to the law is a genuine explanatory attitude that is not reducible to our 
individual dispositions regarding the content or the formal validity of the law. At the 
                                                 
6 For an attitudinal interpretation of explanation, see Frederick Stoutland, 
Determinism, Intentional Action, and Bodily Movements in Constantine Sandis (ed), 
New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp 322 ff. 
 22
same time, assuming an explanatory stance towards the law is first-personal in the 
sense that we are deliberatively engaged in a process of figuring out whether a legal 
proposition has a normative impact on us qua agents. Therefore, the relevant 
explanatory attitude7 I am trying to showcase should not be confused with third-
personal nomic explanations whereby we set out to discover independently existing 
natural patterns by formulating nomic generalizations as to how or why certain things 
came or ceased to be, or changed. 
A final step before concluding with my account of law’s normative function is to 
realize that adopting an explanatory attitude towards the law is not co-extensional 
with trying to interpret the content of the law in a way that makes it morally or 
‘legally’ justifiable. Neither the process not the outcome of figuring out what the law 
requires in a particular case is what furnishes (or not) a reason to act accordingly. That 
is not to deny that the epistemology of law may track down what makes law 
normatively relevant, but that is a rather different issue. To illustrate my point, think 
of a judge who gives reasons for her conclusions about what the law is in a particular 
case. To sharpen the contrast I shall adopt, for the sake of argument, the view that 
what makes law what it is itself a normative matter, that is, it requires some sort of 
                                                 
7 A relevant argument is made by Ronald Dworkin for whom the mutual concern 
displayed within the context of a ‘true’ community is not a matter of psychological 
conditions, rather it is ‘[t]he concern they require is an interpretive property of the 
group’s practices of asserting and acknowledging responsibilities—these must be 
practices that people with the right level of concern would adopt—not a psychological 
property of some fixed number of the actual members’ (Law’s Empire, p 201). My 
contrast with Dworkin’s conception is that his interpretive attitude is already guided 
by a robust conception of legality qua integrity. An interpretive attitude is more like 
trying to fine-tune the content of the law so that it fits a morally proper scheme of 
principle. By contrast, the explanatory attitude I am putting forward is not aimed at 
calibrating the content of the law to an ideal of some sort, but starts from a point 
where the determination of the content of the law has already taken place. No matter 
which interpretive method or type of legal reasoning is used, it is still intelligible to 
ask what types of reasons for action are furnished by a particular legal fact or 
proposition.   
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moral reasoning to detect the reasons that contribute to making the law what it is. I am 
taking the strongest scenario where a fact about the content of the law is—at least for 
no hardcore legal positivists—the conclusion of a reasoning process that includes 
moral reasons as well as non-normative legal considerations. Even if we assume that 
it is precisely those reasons—that is, this proper deliberative route—that make law 
what it is and not, say, contingent facts about the attitudes of law-makers or law-
appliers, this conclusion is far from qualifying as an answer to the question of whether 
a legal proposition so construed is a reason-giving fact in the sense I have explained 
in the first part of this paper. Even if, arguendo, the fact that something qualifies as 
the content of the law is determined by a moral reasoning process, it is not this very 
same fact that makes it the case that we have a reason to act accordingly. My point is 
that even if we assume that given the moral soundness of our reasoning our 
conclusion about what the law requires is a normative one, it is not the properly 
normative one to answer the question of whether there is a normative reason to act on 
this conclusion. What provides the answer to the latter question are rather the relevant 
moral principles or features of the particular situation whether or not they all figure as 
premises in our legal reasoning.  
What lies behind the subtle distinction I am trying to defend is that neither the 
quality of our legal reasoning nor general facts about the content of the law—that is, 
true propositions like ‘everyone ought to pay capital gains taxes’—do themselves 
provide the explanation as to whether an agent has a reason to conform or not; what 
they do instead is to enable the explanation which is furnished by the proper moral or 
prudential reasons that may figure or not in the legal reasoning process. The 
distinction I am making is already familiar from the thought-provoking work of 
Jonathan Dancy whose argument—within a different context—is analyzed into 
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interrelated claims: (i) moral explanations are functions of features that perform the 
role of favouring a particular act and of features that enable the favouring 
considerations to perform their role, (ii) the normativity of moral explanations—that 
is, what makes an action right—is a function of the favouring considerations and not 
of the so-called enablers.8 Thus, among the following considerations, that is, the fact 
that I have promised to φ and the fact that my promise was not given under duress, 
only the former qualifies as the fact that provides a reason to φ. The latter 
consideration helps to determine whether all things considered this basic reason is 
operative in the particular case. My way of applying this distinction in the legal case 
is to take a fact about the content of the law as functioning as the enabler of an 
explanation as to why one has a reason to conform or not to this content. Whereas I 
am agnostic about whether moral principles—that is, overall judgements about what 
there is a reason to do—can combine the favouring and the enabling notions into one 
function, I am rather confident that legal facts are not normatively fundamental in any 
robust sense so as to qualify themselves as reason-giving facts. On my understanding, 
legal facts are universal enablers in the sense that they do not constitute the grounds 
on which action in accordance with the law is normatively required or not but they are 
always an enabling condition of the corresponding normative explanation.  
That brings me to my final thesis regarding the way law performs its normative 
function. I believe that legal normativity has a peculiar operative canon that makes it 
distinct without undermining in any sense our moral judgement. My point is that law 
operates on the basis of a general wide-scope explanatory requirement that has the 
following structure: 
                                                 
8 See, Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004, pp 38-43. 
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(i) Facts about what the law is in a particular case are not the facts that 
properly ground the relevant reasons for (or against) acting in accordance 
with the law  
(ii) The facts that favour or disfavour compliance with the law are ordinary 
moral or prudential considerations pertaining to a particular case 
(iii)  Facts about what the law is in a particular case enable the explanation of 
whether one has a reason to act in accordance with the law or not. 
(iv) What explains the fact that legal facts are enabling conditions is the very 
practice of legal judgment 
The above points can be condensed into the following explanatory requirement 
formula: 
One is not to confound two different kinds of explanatory attitudes towards the law, 
that is, the explanation of whether one has a normative reason to comply and the 
explanation of why legal facts enable the former explanation.  
The requirement is negative is the sense that all that is prohibited is to explain why 
law is a universal enabler by citing the grounds of the explanation as to whether one 
has a moral or prudential reason to act in accordance with the law. This explanatory 
requirement is second-order in the sense that it refers to the proper relations among 
two different explanatory attitudes.  
The crucial element in this argument is that moral or prudential grounds cannot be 
invoked in explaining why facts about legal content are enabling conditions of 
normative explanations, not in explaining why a particular proposition is a legal fact. 
Irrespective of what legal reasoning methodology one applies, the outcome is always 
a verdictive judgment about what the law requires. That judgment may be morally or 
legally fallible but somehow there has to be a closure beyond which the normative 
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question arises as to whether one has a normative reason to act on this judgment. 
Usually the most ultimate way to reach this closure within a legal system is to reach a 
final judicial decision at a supreme-court level. It is not that intermediary—even 
extra-judiciary—legal judgments cannot equally enable normative explanations; they 
surely can. It’s just that their impact may not be dispositive of a particular case in the 
way that a final judgment is. Hence, the explanation of why a legal fact is an enabling 
condition always comes after a more or less veridictive judgment as to what the law 
requires. The answer to the question of why a legal fact is an enabler is constitutive in 
the sense that it is just what it is for a legal fact to qualify as enabler that it has been 
determined as such as a result of a certain official practice. What makes law what it is 
and what explains it enabling function are not identical questions.    
    
     
 
 
 
